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User Management Security Analysis

📊 Overview

This document analyzes the security of the user management and permission system implemented in the Dust Ranger Data Management System.

Date: 2026-01-09 Version: 2.1.0

🔐 Security Layers

Layer 1: Frontend Protection (User Experience)

Purpose: Improve UX, prevent accidental access

Components:

  • ProtectedRoute - Route-level permission checks
  • AppMenu - Menu filtering based on permissions
  • PermissionGate - Component-level conditional rendering

Security Level: ⚠️ LOW (Can be bypassed)

  • Users can modify client-side JavaScript
  • Browser DevTools can alter React state
  • Direct URL access without menu navigation

Verdict: This layer is NOT a security boundary, only a UX enhancement.


Layer 2: Database Row-Level Security (Critical)

Purpose: Enforce data access control at the database level

Components:

  • PostgreSQL Row-Level Security (RLS) policies
  • Helper functions: is_admin(), get_user_permitted_sites(), can_user_edit_site()
  • JWT token verification by Supabase

Security Level:HIGH (Cannot be bypassed)

  • Executed on the server side
  • Applied to all database queries automatically
  • Enforced before data is returned to the client

Current Status:

Protected Operations:

  • SELECT - All data tables filtered by site permissions
  • Permission tables - Admin-only write access
  • User profiles - Admin can update, users can view own

⚠️ Previously Unprotected (Fixed in migration 20260109):

  • INSERT - Users could insert data for any site
  • UPDATE - Users could modify data for unauthorized sites
  • DELETE - Users could delete data for unauthorized sites

Verdict: This is the primary security boundary and is now comprehensive.


Layer 3: Supabase Authentication

Purpose: Verify user identity

Components:

  • JWT tokens signed with secret key
  • Token expiration (configurable)
  • Refresh token rotation

Security Level:HIGH

  • Industry-standard JWT implementation
  • Tokens cannot be forged without the secret key
  • Automatic token refresh

Verdict: Properly implemented and secure.


🛡️ Security Improvements Implemented

1. Write Operation RLS Policies (NEW)

Migration: 20260109000000_add_write_rls_policies.sql

Added comprehensive RLS policies for:

  • ✅ INSERT operations - Users can only insert data for permitted sites
  • ✅ UPDATE operations - Users can only update data for permitted sites
  • ✅ DELETE operations - Users can only delete data for permitted sites
  • ✅ Configuration tables - Only admins can modify mine sites

Impact: Prevents unauthorized data modification via API calls.

2. Audit Logging (NEW)

Purpose: Track all permission changes for compliance and debugging

Features:

  • Logs all changes to user_module_permissions
  • Logs all changes to user_site_permissions
  • Logs role and is_active changes to user_profiles
  • Stores old and new values for change tracking
  • Admin-only access to audit logs

Benefits:

  • Detect unauthorized access attempts
  • Compliance with security audit requirements
  • Debug permission issues

3. Enhanced Permission Helper

Function: can_user_edit_site(site_id UUID)

  • Centralized logic for checking edit permissions
  • Used by all write RLS policies
  • Marked as SECURITY DEFINER for consistent execution

🔍 Attack Scenarios & Mitigations

Scenario 1: User Modifies Client-Side Code

Attack: User opens DevTools, modifies React state to grant themselves permissions

Frontend Protection: ❌ FAILS - User can see UI for unauthorized pages

Database Protection: ✅ BLOCKS - RLS policies prevent data access

sql
-- User tries to query dust levels for unauthorized site
SELECT * FROM data_dust_levels WHERE mine_site_id = 'unauthorized-site-id';
-- Result: 0 rows (filtered by RLS)

Verdict: Attack fails at the database layer.


Scenario 2: Direct API Manipulation

Attack: User uses browser DevTools to send direct Supabase API calls

Example:

javascript
// Attacker tries to insert data for unauthorized site
await supabase.from('data_dust_levels').insert({
  mine_site_id: 'unauthorized-site-id',
  dust_reading: 100
});

Database Protection: ✅ BLOCKS - INSERT policy checks permissions

sql
-- RLS policy checks:
WITH CHECK (
  is_admin(auth.uid()) OR
  mine_site_id IS NULL OR
  can_user_edit_site(mine_site_id)
)
-- Result: INSERT denied

Verdict: Attack fails. User receives permission denied error.


Scenario 3: Token Theft (Session Hijacking)

Attack: Attacker steals user's JWT token

Supabase Protection:

  • ✅ Tokens have expiration time
  • ✅ Refresh tokens can be revoked
  • ✅ RLS still applies based on token's user_id

Limitation: If token is stolen, attacker has same permissions as user until token expires

Mitigation Recommendations:

  1. Implement IP address validation (optional)
  2. Short token expiration (e.g., 1 hour)
  3. Mandatory re-authentication for sensitive operations
  4. Monitor for unusual access patterns

Scenario 4: SQL Injection

Attack: User tries to inject SQL through input fields

Protection:

  • ✅ Supabase client uses parameterized queries
  • ✅ All user input is properly escaped
  • ✅ No raw SQL concatenation in codebase

Verdict: Supabase SDK prevents SQL injection by design.


Scenario 5: Privilege Escalation

Attack: Regular user tries to grant themselves admin role

Frontend Protection: ❌ FAILS - User could modify form values

Database Protection: ✅ BLOCKS - RLS policy on user_profiles

sql
-- Only admins can update user roles
CREATE POLICY "Admins can update all profiles"
  ON user_profiles
  FOR UPDATE
  USING (is_admin(auth.uid()))
  WITH CHECK (is_admin(auth.uid()));

Verdict: Attack fails. Non-admin cannot modify roles.


📋 Security Checklist

✅ Completed

  • [x] RLS enabled on all data tables
  • [x] SELECT policies implemented
  • [x] INSERT policies implemented
  • [x] UPDATE policies implemented
  • [x] DELETE policies implemented
  • [x] Permission tables protected (admin-only write)
  • [x] Audit logging for permission changes
  • [x] Frontend route protection
  • [x] Frontend menu filtering
  • [x] Helper functions for permission checks
  • [ ] Implement rate limiting on API calls
  • [ ] Add IP-based access restrictions (optional)
  • [ ] Implement 2FA for admin accounts
  • [ ] Add session timeout warnings
  • [ ] Create security monitoring dashboard
  • [ ] Regular security audits of RLS policies
  • [ ] Penetration testing

🔒 Optional Enhancements

  • [ ] End-to-end encryption for sensitive data
  • [ ] Database encryption at rest
  • [ ] Regular automated security scans
  • [ ] Implement Content Security Policy (CSP)
  • [ ] Add Subresource Integrity (SRI) for CDN resources

🎯 Conclusion

Current Security Posture: ✅ STRONG

Strengths:

  1. ✅ Database-layer enforcement (RLS) is comprehensive
  2. ✅ All write operations are protected
  3. ✅ Permission changes are audited
  4. ✅ Frontend provides good UX with permission filtering

Weaknesses:

  1. ⚠️ Frontend protection can be bypassed (by design, acceptable)
  2. ⚠️ No rate limiting on API calls
  3. ⚠️ No 2FA for admin accounts

Is it safe? YES, with caveats:

For Production Use:

  • ✅ Safe for internal corporate use
  • ✅ Safe for data with medium sensitivity
  • ✅ Database security is enterprise-grade

Important Notes:

  1. Trust the Database, Not the Client - All security decisions are made at the database level
  2. Frontend is for UX - Frontend protections improve user experience but are not security boundaries
  3. Regular Audits - Monitor the audit log for suspicious activity
  4. Keep Dependencies Updated - Regularly update Supabase and other dependencies

Immediate:

  1. ✅ Apply migration 20260109000000_add_write_rls_policies.sql
  2. ✅ Test with restricted users to verify access controls
  3. Monitor audit logs for first few days

Short-term (1-2 weeks):

  1. Implement rate limiting on Edge Functions
  2. Add session timeout warnings
  3. Create runbook for security incidents

Long-term (1-3 months):

  1. Consider implementing 2FA for admin accounts
  2. Set up automated security scanning
  3. Conduct penetration testing

📚 References